Maastricht and the environment: German perspective ; Vortrag vor dem Europa-Institut der Universität des Saarlandes, Saarbrücken, den 7. Februar 1995 by Spießhofer, Birgit
  
 
 
 
 
 
MAASTRICHT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
-GERMAN PERSPECTIVE- 
 
 
 
by 
 
Dr. Birgit Spießhofer 
 
Frankfurt/Main  
 
Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
MAASTRICHT AND THE ENVIRONMENT - GERMAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
Dr. Birgit Spießhofer 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 
B. The Maastricht-Decision of the German Supreme Court 
 
I. Outline of the Maastricht-Decision 
 
II. Review of the Maastricht-Decision 
 
 
C. Evaluation of the Environmental Provisions of the 
Maastricht-Treaty 
 
I. The pre-Maastricht Situation 
 
II. The Environmental Provisions in the Maastricht Treaty 
 
1. Outline 
 
2. Evaluation 
 
 
D. The Impact of the Maastricht-Decision on the 
Environmental Provisions of the EC Treaty  
 
 
E. Résumé  
 
 
 
  
 
 
-2- 
 
 
MAASTRICHT AND THE ENVIRONMENT - GERMAN PERSPECTIVE  
 
Dr. Birgit Spießhofer 
 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, signed on February 
7, 19921, postulates in its Preamble to introduce a "new 
stage of European integration"; Art. A (2) refers to "a new 
stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among 
the peoples of Europe". The Maastricht Treaty consists 
essentially of its three "pillars": Amendments to the 
existing Community Treaties (Titles II - IV), containing i.a. 
the schedule for the creation of an economic and monetary 
union, provisions on a common foreign and security policy 
(Title V) and provisions on cooperation in the fields of 
justice and home affairs (Title VI), all three of which are 
bound together within the constitutional order of the newly-
created European Union.  
 
The provisions on the protection of the environment do not 
appear to have been altered in a spectacular way - at least 
not at first sight. A thorough analysis, however, taking into 
consideration the German Supreme Court's2 restrictive rules 
of interpreting the Maastricht Treaty, will produce a 
different picture: the amendments, although subtle, may 
entail far-reaching consequences such as lowering the 
Community-wide level of environmental protection and 
increasing the variety of environmental regulations and 
standards, thus impeding free trade and augmenting the 
potential for a distortion of competition.  
                     
1
 see: Bulletin of the German Government Nr. 16, p. 113 of Febr. 12, 
1992. 
2
 see: decision of Oct. 12, 1993, EuR 1993, 294 ("Maastricht-
Decision"). 
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In Germany, the Maastricht Treaty encountered rather harsh 
critique and wide-spread firm opposition due to economic, 
political and legal considerations3: The Germans' "holy cow", 
the Deutsche Mark, symbol and guarantee for monetary 
stability and economic growth was scheduled to be 
"slaughtered". The German Länder (states) regarded the 
Maastricht Treaty as a (further) jeopardy to their 
competences and powers as granted by the German Constitution; 
they took refuge to the principle of subsidiarity4 and to 
amendments to the German Constitution, introducing a 
cooperation procedure between the federal government, the 
federal parliament and the states whenever state interests 
are at stake in European affairs5. Another argument, 
apparently not raised in any of the other EC Member States, 
was the concern that the Federal Republic of Germany could 
                     
3
 see: e.g. Hilf, Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den 
Föderalismus in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz? EuR 1993, 
p. 327, Stein, p. 328, Schweitzer, p. 329; Frühauf/Gusinger, Europa 
ohne Grenzen - Alarm für die Umwelt, Spiegelverlag 1992; Pernice, 
Karlsruhe locuta - Maastricht in Kraft, EuZW 1993, p. 649; 
Schröder, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als Hüter des Staates im 
Prozeß der europäischen Integration, DVBl. 1994, p. 316; Pipkorn, 
Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip im Vertrag über die Europäische 
Union-rechtliche Bedeutung und gerichtliche Überprüfbarkeit, EuZW 
1992, p. 697; Ress, Umweltrecht und Umweltpolitik der europäischen 
Gemeinschaft nach dem Vertrag über die Europäische Union, 
Schriftenreihe des Europa-Instituts Saarbrücken, Nr. 291. 
4
 see: Lambers, Subsidiarität in Europa - Allheilmittel oder 
juristische Leerformel?, EuR 1993, p. 229 (235); Art. 23 sec. 1 of 
the German Constitution incorporates subsidiarity as a basic 
principle of the European Union.  
5
 see: Art. 23 German Constitution; Art. 50 and Art. 52 sec. 3a 
German Constitution provide for a cooperation of the Bundesrat 
(chamber ob states) in European matters and empower the Bundesrat 
to establish a "Europakammer" (Chamber for European Affairs) which 
will take its decisions on behalf of the Bundesrat. The cooperation 
procedure between the federal bodies and the states is further 
specified in "Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern 
in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union (EUZBLG) - of March 12, 
1993, BGBl. I, 313;  
 see: Borchmann, Neue Bund-Länder-Vereinbarung über die 
Zusammenarbeit in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union, EuZW 
1994, 172; Crossland, ELR 1993, p. 228 (236). 
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loose its quality as a sovereign state6. The democratic 
principle was considered to be violated by the Maastricht 
Treaty, as extensive competences were transferred to the 
European Council, consisting of the heads of Government who 
are lacking direct democratic legitimation by their 
respective people; the additional transfer of competences 
from the national states to the European Union was considered 
to erode the influence of the directly elected national 
parliament, thereby weakening each citizen's right to vote 
and to influence the democratic process7. 
 
In its so-called "Maastricht-Decision", the German Supreme 
Court had to face the difficult task to balance the above 
political and constitutional arguments with the political 
pressure exercised by the other EC Member States, as the 
entering into force of the Maastricht Treaty depended (in the 
end) exclusively on the German Supreme Court ruling. The 
Supreme Court accommodated these conflicting strains by 
issuing a solid "yes, but"-decision, regarded as a "manual on 
the Law of the European Union on an exclusive level"8 - and 
as a master piece of diplomacy9. This decision is considered 
to be a landmark decision on the relationship between the 
European Union and the Federal Republic of Germany as well as 
on the interpretation and application of European law (in 
Germany). 
 
As the German Supreme Court ruling has to be regarded as the 
official and authoritative German legal interpretation of the 
Maastricht Treaty, and as this decision is laying the ground 
                     
6
 see: Schröder, Fn 3, p. 317; Fastenrath, Maastricht und ein 
Trugschluß. Deutschlands Eigenstaatlichkeit in der Europäischen 
Union, FAZ Nr. 185 of Aug. 12, 1993, p. 5. 
7
 see: statements of plaintiffs in Maastricht proceedings before the 
German Supreme Court, Fn 2, p. 299 et seq.  
8
 see: Pernice, Fn. 3. 
9
 see: Schröder, Fn. 3, p. 316. 
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for the application and construction of the environmental 
provisions of the Maastricht Treaty in Germany, it is 
imperative to analyse its basic holdings and to sketch the 
Supreme Court's understanding of the legal structure of the 
European Union. 
 
 
B. The Maastricht-Decision of the German Supreme Court 
 
I. Outline of the Maastricht-Decision 
 
According to German constitutional law international treaties 
have to be ratified by a formal approval act10. The approval 
act ratifying the Maastricht Treaty was challenged by five 
plaintiffs claiming the violation of various constitutional 
provisions. Due to the procedure chosen11 the Supreme Court's 
review of the Maastricht Treaty or the approval act, 
respectively, was restricted to the question whether any of 
the plaintiffs' individual constitutional rights were 
violated, i.e. the Supreme Court could not examine the 
overall compliance of the Maastricht Treaty with the German 
Constitution (such as the federal principle). Due to this 
limited angle the Supreme Court had to dismiss all but one 
complaint and based its judgement exclusively on the 
examination whether the plaintiff's right to vote12, 
construed as the citizen's right to influence the democratic 
decision making process, was violated by the Maastricht 
Treaty or the approval act, respectively. Nonetheless, the 
Supreme Court took the chance to develop its view of the 
legal structure of the European Union, its relationship to 
                     
10
 see: Art. 59 sec. 2 Basic Law (Grundgesetz); Crossland ELR 1993, 
236. 
11
 see: Art. 93 sec. 1 No. 4 a Basic Law (Verfassungsbewerde). 
12
 see: Art. 38 Basic Law in conjunction with Art. 79 sec. 3 and Art. 
20 Basic Law. 
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the Federal Republic of Germany and its legislative bodies, 
and the (future) application and construction of EC law, the 
latter having a major impact on the interpretation of 
environmental competences and the Community-wide 
environmental protection as designed by the Maastricht 
Treaty. The essentials of the Maastricht-Decision may be 
sketched as follows: 
 
- The Maastricht Treaty does not create  "United States of 
Europe", comparable to the United States of America. The 
European Union is characterised as a "Staatenverbund", 
i.e. as a supranational organisation and association of 
sovereign states, whose power and competences are 
derivative, i.e. granted by the Member States13. This 
basic understanding of the European Union leads to the 
following consequences: 
 
- Art. F sec. 3 EU Treaty does not provide the European 
Union with a "competence-competence", i.e. the power to 
extend its competences and raise the financial means 
which it deems necessary to achieve the objectives of 
the Treaty. The tasks conveyed upon the European bodies 
by the EU Treaty do not allow the conclusion that the 
European Union may create or assume the competences 
necessary to fulfil these tasks. To the contrary, the 
European Union may only claim such competences which are 
explicitly assigned to it by the EU Treaty (principle of 
enumerated competences)14.  
 
- The competences transferred to the European Union by the 
EU Treaty are described in a sufficiently specific way. 
Each step beyond or change of this clearly defined 
                     
13
 Maastricht-Decision, Fn. 2, p. 312 et seq. 
14
 Maastricht-Decision, Fn. 2, p. 316. 
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integration programme will not be covered by the German 
approval act but evoke the need of a new approval by the 
German legislative bodies. 
 
- A clear line of distinction has to be drawn between the 
interpretation of the Treaty and amendments to it. This 
distinction has a significant impact on the future 
application of provisions empowering the European Union 
to enact legislation: The dynamic extension of the 
existing EC-Treaties - and of the environmental 
protection on the EC-level - was based i.a. on a 
generous application of Art. 235 EC Treaty, on the 
"implied powers"-doctrine (EC-annex competence to round 
off the explicitly conveyed competences) and on the 
"effet utile" principle (i.e. the EC Treaty has to be 
construed in a way that the EC-competences are expanded 
to the utmost extent possible); contrary to this broad 
and EC-friendly understanding developed by the European 
Court of Justice, the German Supreme Court demands that 
the EC bodies take into consideration when applying the 
competence provisions that the EU Treaty distinguishes 
clearly between the limited and enumerated powers 
conveyed upon the EU and an amendment to the Treaty and 
that the interpretation of the Treaty may not result in 
an extension of competences. Such an "extensive 
interpretation" of competence-transferring provisions 
would not be binding on the Federal Republic of 
Germany15.  
 
- Applying its enumerated competences, the European Union 
is further restricted by the principle of subsidiarity 
as laid down in Art. 3 b sec. 2 EC Treaty. This means 
that even when the European bodies are explicitly 
                     
15
 Maastricht-Decision, Fn. 2, p. 324. 
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empowered by the EC Treaty to take action they have to 
make the additional "subsidiarity check" before they can 
do so. The principle of subsidiarity as stipulated in 
Art. 3 b sec. 2 EC Treaty, is (now) applicable to any 
kind of action taken by the European Community16. If the 
European Community intends to exercise its legislative 
power as determined by the EC Treaty it has to check 
first (and has to give an appropriate explanation 
according to Art. 190 EC Treaty) whether the objective 
of the measure envisaged cannot be sufficiently attained 
by actions of the Member States on the national level. 
If the EC decides that national action will not suffice 
the further conclusion has to be justified that the 
objective can be better attained at a Community level, 
taking into consideration the scope or the effects of 
the measure17.  
 
- The federal government has to exercise its influence on 
the EC bodies in favour of a strict application of the 
subsidiarity provision; the federal parliament has to 
use its co-decision rights18 in the same sense. It is to 
be expected that the Chamber of States (Bundesrat) will 
pay specific attention to the subsidiarity principle19. 
 
- Community action is further restricted by Art. 3 b 
sec. 3 EC Treaty: Community action may not go beyond the 
                     
16
 Before Maastricht, the principle of subsidiarity was only mentioned 
in the environmental provision Art. 130 r sec. 4 EC Treaty and had 
a different wording which was by far more in favour of Community 
actions: "The Community shall take action relating to the 
environment to the extent to which the objectives referred to in 
paragraph 1 can be attained better at Community level than at the 
level of the individual Member States". 
17
 Maastricht-Decision, Fn. 2, p. 324 et seq. 
18
 see: Art. 23 sec. 3 Basic Law (German Constitution). 
19
 Maastricht-Decision, Fn. 2, p. 325. 
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measures which are absolutely necessary and adequate to 
attain the objectives of the Treaty. 
 
- If Community legislation is not covered by the EU Treaty 
as approved by the act of the German parliament it is 
not binding on the Federal Republic of Germany; the 
German legislative and administrative bodies would be 
prohibited to apply these Community acts in Germany. 
Although claiming a cooperative relationship with the 
European Court of Justice, the German Supreme Court 
usurps the authority to be the final instance (for 
Germany) to examine whether European legislation is 
within the scope of the EU Treaty20. 
 
Summarizing the above holdings, the German Supreme Court, 
based on the democratic principle reserves competences to the 
maximum extent possible for the national state and its 
legislative bodies by construing the Treaty provisions on 
Community competences in an extremely narrow way and by 
declaring itself as the competent body to pass the final 
judgement on the compliance of (secondary) EU-law with the EU 
Treaty21.  
 
 
II. Review of the Maastricht-Decision 
 
Although the German Supreme Court's Maastricht-Decision 
circumvents the consequence to declare the parliamentary act 
ratifying the Maastricht Treaty void, its narrow construction 
of EC-competences comes close to it as it leads to an 
inversion of the objectives underlying the Maastricht Treaty: 
accelerating and consolidating the process of European 
                     
20
 Maastricht-Decision, Fn. 2, p. 312. 
21
 see: Pernice, Fn. 3. 
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integration22. Insofar, the description of the Decision as a 
"masterpiece of diplomacy"23 is justified: the Maastricht 
Treaty passed and the political desaster was averted, on the 
merits, however, the German Supreme Court stopped the 
development towards European integration and strengthened the 
national influence and competences. As one commentator put 
it: the German Supreme Court pulled the emergency brakes, at 
a point, however, when the European train had already reached 
a fullstop as regards the integration of European law and 
European politics24. 
 
The approach chosen by the German Supreme Court is an 
exclusively national one, based on a specific dogmatic 
understanding of constitutional principles, in particular, 
the democratic principle. "Judicial self-restraint" is not 
the governing attitude of the Maastricht-Decision. The German 
Supreme Court did not restrict itself to declaring the 
Maastricht Treaty approval act valid or void, but used 
"obiter dicta", i.e. comments on the merits, which are not 
legally binding, in order to transport and publish its view 
on the construction and application of European law. The 
Maastricht-Decision is therefore considered to be a clear 
setback in the line of the Supreme Court decisions concerning 
European integration 25.  
 
Former Supreme Court decisions stated that secondary 
Community law has to be examined under the perspective 
whether it meets the standard of European primary law such as 
the EC-Treaties or the European Human Rights Convention; the 
necessity of an additional check of its compliance with 
                     
22
 see: Meessen, Maastricht nach Karlsruhe, NJW 1994, 549; Pernice, 
FN. 3. 
23
 see: Schröder, Fn 3, p. 316. 
24
 Meessen, Fn. 21, p. 554; see also: Lane, New Community Competences 
under the Maastricht Treaty, Common Market Law Review 30, p. 939. 
25
 Meesen, Fn. 21, p. 549 et seq. 
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German consitutional law was negated. The European Court of 
Justice's authority to pass the final judgement on the 
validity of secondary Community law was acknowledged26. 
 
In light of the former increasingly pro-European jurisdiction 
of the German Supreme Court the Maastricht-Decision is 
undoubtedly a setback. One indication is the creation of the 
new term "Staatenverbund" meant to make clear that the 
European Union is not a federal state based on a European 
people and that the European Union is not an independent and 
autonomous legal subject but only the description of the 
Member States acting jointly27. More problematic in its 
consequences, however, is the German Supreme Court's approach 
to develop its own principles of interpretation of the EU 
Treaty negating the generous construction and application of 
EC-competence norms as stipulated by the European Court of 
Justice in its "implied powers" doctrine and the " effet 
utile" interpretation principle. There is an open conflict as 
regards the basic approach towards the interpretation of 
primary European law. As it is not to be expected that the 
European Court of Justice will abstain from applying its 
basic interpretation principles and will adopt the German 
approach, the question arises: whose interpretation and 
construction of the EU Treaty shall be authoritative? Shall 
the European Court of Justice's interpretation principles be 
binding on all Member States except the Federal Republic of 
Germany? Or does the "cooperative" approach of the German 
Supreme Court mean that EC legislation, although held to be 
in compliance with the EU Treaty by the European Court of 
Justice, has to pass an additional test in Germany, i.e. the 
compliance with the narrowly construed competence norms as 
                     
26
 see: BVerfGE 73, 339 (387); BVerfGE 75, 223 (234); see also: 
Meessen, Fn. 21, p. 549 et seq. 
27
 see: Pernice, Fn. 3. 
  
 
 
-12- 
 
 
developed in the Maastricht Decision? In the extreme the 
approach chosen by the German Supreme Court may generate the 
consequence that the European Court of Justice may hold a 
Community action as being in compliance with the EU Treaty 
whereas the German Supreme Court, looking through its 
national constitutional glasses, may reach a different 
conclusion. Thus, the German Supreme Court created on the 
basis of national constitutional law an "opt out" 
reservation, not included in the EU Treaty, not to be 
exercised by the German parliament or government but by the 
German Supreme Court. If the other Member States follow the 
German example and develop their own rules of interpretation 
of the EU Treaty reserving the right for themselves to decide 
with binding effect for their respective territory whether 
they feel that e.g. an EC directive is in compliance with the 
EU Treaty - and who should harmonize the potentially 
different approaches chosen by the various Member States? - 
the binding and harmonizing effect of EC law could be 
nullified. We may get as many "authoritative" interpretations 
of the EU Treaty as there are Member States. 
 
This potential effect of the Maastricht Decision is extremely 
destructive for the process of European integration, having 
as its main basis the general acceptance of all Member States 
that EC-legislation is binding on each and any of the Member 
States, unless there are explicit exemptions in the European 
law or the EC action is declared void by the European Court 
of Justice because it is not in compliance with the EC 
Treaty. An explicit exemption in favour of certain Member 
States is included in the political will of the Member States 
as formulated by the European Council and the European 
Parliament. A decision of the European Court of Justice on 
the compliance of secondary EC-law with the EU Treaty will be 
binding without exception for all Member States. By 
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introducing an "opt out"-reservation the German Supreme Court 
appears to have intruded into the political sphere 
disregarding, the political will of all Member States, 
including the Federal Republic of Germany, stipulated in Art. 
164, 177 EEC Treaty that the European Court of Justice is 
designed to be the final instance to decide on the compliance 
of EC secondary law with the provisions of the EC Treaty. 
Art. 164, 177 EC Treaty were - at least so far - not held 
unconstitutional by the German Supreme Court.  
 
The German Supreme Court has to control the compliance of the 
Maastricht Treaty as such with the German constitutional law. 
The interpretation and application of the Maastricht Treaty, 
however, is the realm of the European Court of Justice. This 
approach is imperative in order to avoid the legal insecurity 
entailed by national reservations as the one stated by the 
German Supreme Court.  
 
The method often chosen by the Supreme Court to avoid the 
invalidation of a German legislative act by giving it a 
restrictive interpretation in conformity with the German 
Constitution, works as far as merely German laws are 
concerned and German courts or legislative and administrative 
bodies shall be bound, i.e. it is designed for the vertical 
hierarchy; the same method applied in the Maastricht Decision 
creates unsolvable problems as the relation to the European 
Court of Justice is a "horizontal" one. Such "cooperation" 
with the European Court of Justice does not seem to be 
appropriate from a European perspective. 
 
As regards the application of the environmental provisions of 
the Maastricht Treaty and the European Community's objective 
to attain environmental protection at a high level28, the 
                     
28
 Art. 100 a sec. 3 EC Treaty. 
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Maastricht-Decision leads to the question whether we will not 
only face a three-speed Europe as regards environmental 
protection29, set up in Art. 130 r to t EC Treaty, but a 
separate German track with a specific "opt out" possibility 
generated by the German Supreme Court, enabling the Federal 
Republic of Germany to uncouple its environmental standards 
and to determine on its own the speed of the environmental 
development in Germany. Beyond the aforesaid the vision of a 
multi-speed Europe arises if the other Member States follow 
the German example, in particular, in applying the principle 
of subsidiarity in an extensive way. 
 
Before looking into this question the amendments to the 
environmental provisions brought about by the Maastricht 
Treaty shall be analysed under the perspective whether the 
environmental protection is strengthened or weakened by the 
Maastricht Treaty and whether a conflict between 
environmental protection on a high level on one hand and 
subsidiarity on the other is programmed which may invite the 
application of interpretation principles, such as the ones 
developed by the German Supreme Court, and may open the door 
for national side-tracks which will not promote the original 
goal of the Maastricht-Treaty, namely to further European 
integration. 
 
 
C. Evaluation of the Environmental Provisions of the 
Maastricht Treaty 
 
I. The pre-Maastricht Situation 
 
                     
29
 see: ELR 1993, p. 473 (editorial); Epiney/Furrer, Umweltschutz nach 
Maastricht - Ein Europa der drei Geschwindigkeiten? EuR 1992, p. 
369. 
  
 
 
-15- 
 
 
Although it was not mentioned in the original EEC Treaty, 
environmental protection was considered by the Court of 
Justice to constitute a mandatory requirement capable of 
justifying national barriers to the free movement of goods, 
at first implicitly, as an "essential objective" of the 
Community30, and then explicitly31. Even prior to the entry 
into force of the Single European Act, a large amount of 
Community legislation had been adopted in the field by 
authority of Art. 100 and/or 235 the ostensible and primary 
purposes of which were the harmonisation of national laws 
which impeded the Common market or a levelling of the playing 
field for purposes of competition.  
 
The EEC Treaty was amended by the Single European Act to take 
significant account of the environment. Commission proposals 
for internal market legislation under Art. 100 a are required 
to proceed from a high level of protection32, and it may be 
invoked to justify national derogation from any such 
legislation33. Art. 130 r to 130 t provide guidelines and 
authority for Community action including the principles of 
prevention, rectification at source and "polluter pays"34, a 
commitment to international cooperation35 and, an express 
competence for EC-legislation in the environmental field36. 
Art. 130 r sec. 4 contains the one express subsidiarity rule 
in the EEC Treaty and Art. 130 r sec. 2 the one integration 
clause: Community action is justified to the extent to which 
environmental protection can be better attained at Community 
                     
30
 Case 240/83, Procureur de la République v.Association de Défense de 
Brûleurs d'Huiles Usagées, (1985) ECR 531, (549). 
31
 Case 302/86, Commission vs. Denmark, (1988) ECR 4607.  
32
 EEC Treaty, Art. 100 a sec. 3. 
33
 EEC Treaty, Art. 100 a sec. 4. 
34
 EEC Treaty, Art. 130 r sec. 2. 
35
 EEC Treaty, Art. 130 r sec. 5. 
36
 EEC Treaty, Art. 130 s. 
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level, and environmental protection requirements must be a 
component of the Community's other policies. 
 
Based on these provisions, approximately 400 pieces of 
legislation have been passed up to now37.  
 
 
                     
37
 Important legislative initiatives adopted under present Treaty 
rules include the environmental impact assessment directive 
(Dir.85/337, O.J.1985, L 175/40), acces to environmental 
information directive (Dir. 90/313, O.J. 1990, L 185/56) the 
adoption of an integrated financial instrument for the environment 
(LIFE) (regulation  1973/92, O.J. 1992, L 206/1), and the 
establishment, pending agreement among the Member States as to its 
seat, of a European Environmental Agency and a monitoring and 
information network (regulation 1210/90, O.J. 1990 L 120/1); 
regarding the relationship of internal market provisions and 
environmental law; see: Pernice, Auswirkungen des europäischen 
Binnenmarktes auf das Umweltrecht - Gemeinschafts(verfas-
sungs)rechtliche Grundlangen, NVwZ 1990, 201; see also: Breier, 
Umweltschutz in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, NuR 1993, p. 457; 
Epiney/Furrer, Fn. 29, p. 377 et seq. 
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II. The Environmental Provisions in the Maastricht Treaty 
 
1. Outline 
 
Maastricht re-emphasizes environmental policy but also 
muddies the waters significantly. Art. 2 of the EC Treaty 
recognizes for the first time environmental limitations to 
economic growth by numbering amongst the tasks of the 
Community "sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting 
the environment", a rather tepid commitment from an 
environmentalist's point of view. Art. 3 (k) includes as a 
Community activity a policy in the sphere of the environment. 
The substantive provisions of Title XVI, Art. 130 r to 130 t, 
alter those of the EEC Treaty in the following respects: 
Community policy on environment is to aim at a high level of 
protection-whilst taking account of regional diversity38; 
environmental protection is to include the pre-cautionary 
principle, and its requirement must no longer to be a 
"component" of other policies but rather integrated into 
their definition and implementation39. The specific reference 
to subsidiarity, contained formerly in Art. 130 r sec. 4 EEC 
Treaty, is dropped in the environmental section and 
"upgraded" as a principle generally applicable to the entire 
EC Treaty (Art. 3 b EC Treaty). Legislation intended to adopt 
and implement Community policy is to be adopted by the 
Council in cooperation with, unanimously in consultation 
with, or in co-decision with the Parliament depending on its 
subject matter40. Harmonisation measures must include 
appropriate safeguard clauses permitting provisional national 
measures which protect the environment41. More stringent 
                     
38
 Art. 130 r sec. 2 EC Treaty. 
39
 Art. 130 r sec. 2 EC Treaty. 
40
 Art. 130 s sec. 1 to 3 EC Treaty, see also: Nentwich, 
Institutionelle und verfahrensrechtliche Neuerungen im Vertrag über 
die Europäische Union, EuZW 1992, 235. 
41
 Art. 130 r sec. 2 EC Treaty. 
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national protective measures are admitted but will be 
required to be notified to the Commission42. The Council is 
to be given specific authority to adopt general action 
programmes in the field43. In view of the cost of the 
prospective initiative, it may authorize temporary 
derogations and/or financial support from the Cohesion 
Fund44. 
 
 
2. Evaluation 
 
It is doubtful whether the balance of the Maastricht Treaty 
is positive as regards the protection of the environment. The 
Single European Act introduced into the EEC Treaty two 
principles which may be contrary in their outcome: 
environmental protection on one hand and national autonomy - 
explicitly stated45 or implied in the principle of 
subsidiarity46 - on the other. This potential conflict has 
been exacerbated by the Maastricht Treaty stressing and 
enhancing both principles. 
 
By deleting the term "economic" from the European Economic 
Community, the Maastricht Treaty indicated that the economy 
is no longer the primary or even exclusive focus of the 
European Community. The tasks and objectives of the European 
Union were extended, the integration programme was put on a 
broader basis encompassing beyond the traditional economic 
interest other areas in which European action is necessary 
due to the nature of the subject or desirable in order to 
move towards a European Union. Environmental protection has 
                     
42
 Art. 130 t EC Treaty; see also: Council of Edinburgh, Conclusions 
of the Presidency, Part B, Annex 2, p. 7b. 
43
 Art. 130 s sec. 3 EC Treaty. 
44
 Art. 130 s sec. 5, Art. 130 d EC Treaty. 
45
 Art. 130 t, Art. 100 a EEC Treaty. 
46
 Art. 130 r sec. 4 EEC Treaty. 
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become an element of European politics (at least in 
principle) equally important to economic goals47. As a 
consequence, Art. 2 of the EC Treaty names environmental 
protection as one of the tasks of the Community. The 
environmental action programmes obtained an explicit legal 
basis in Art. 3 (k) EC Treaty. Although these provisions are 
more of a programmatic character and not directly 
enforceable48 they  are an important indication for the rank 
assigned to environmental concerns by the European Community. 
Art. 130 r sec. 2 EC Treaty introduces the, formerly only in 
Art 100 a sec. 3 EEC Treaty mentioned, principle that 
environmental protection shall be achieved at a high level. 
Regional differences have to be taken into consideration when 
defining the level of environmental protection. This means 
that environmental protection is not regarded to be absolute 
but dependent on differing regional situations. This may 
entail differing standards and politics in the Community, 
reducing the positive impact of this clause with regard to 
environmental protection significantly49. 
 
A progressive step from an environmental point of view is the 
introduction of the so-called pre-cautionary principle "which 
enlarges the possibility to take measures already at a time 
when environmental damages are not to be expected yet50. 
Environmental protection is promoted from being a mere 
"component" of Community policies to be integrated into the 
definition and implementation of all Community policies. Like 
a spider's web economic and environmental objectives are now 
recognized to be interdependent, and environmental protection 
must by necessity be an integrated or comprehensive task 
                     
47
 see: Breier, Fn. 36, p. 460; Ress, Fn. 3, p. 1. 
48
 see: Epiney/Furrer; Fn. 29, p. 372 et seq.; Breier, Fn. 36, p. 460; 
Ress, Fn. 3, p. 9. 
49
 see: Epiney/Furrer, Fn. 29, p. 383 et seq. 
50
 see: Epiney/Furrer, Fn. 29, p. 384 et seq.  
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(Querschnittsaufgabe) inextricably interwoven with all other 
Community policies51. The position of the European Parliament 
taking usually a progressive stand as regards environmental 
protection has been further strengthened by the co-decision 
procedure52 . 
 
These undoubtedly positive traits of the Maastricht Treaty, 
consolidating and enhancing environmental protection in the 
Community, are diminished by Treaty provisions extending the 
already existing explicit or implicit derogations in favour 
of national measures thus creating a real risk to develop the 
"two-speed Europe", designed in the EEC Treaty, into a 
"multi-speed Europe"53 as regards the standard of the 
environmental situation in the various Member States.  
 
The Single European Act established a "two-speed Europe" as 
it provided for a "standard" environmental protection basis 
created by measures taken pursuant and Art. 130 r/s EEC 
Treaty, and the derogation in Art. 130 t EEC Treaty, allowing 
Member States to maintain or introduce more stringent 
protective measures. The EEC Treaty contained only a 
derogation in favour of the environment. This result was not 
significantly altered by the principle of subsidiarity as 
originally stated in Art. 130 r sec. 4 EEC Treaty:  
 
"The Community shall take action relating to the 
environment to the extent to which the objectives 
referred to in paragraph 1 can be attained better at 
Community level than at the level of the individual 
Member States." 
 
                     
51
 Art. 130 r sec. 2 EC Treaty; see: Epiney/Furrer, Fn. 29, p. 386; 
Lane, Fn. 24, p. 971. 
52
 Art.89 b EC Treaty; see also: Breier, Fn. 36, p. 460; Nentwich, Fn. 
40. 
53
 see: Editorial, ELR, 1993, 473; Epiney/Furrer, Fn. 29. 
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Subsidiarity was thus stipulated in positive terms, 
interpreted as the task to choose the most appropriate action 
level. Already then some commentators understood the 
"better"-clause as the stipulation of the principle of 
subsidiarity, i.e., the Member States are primarily competent 
to enact the necessary legislation as regards environmental 
issues54. The latter construction was obviously adopted by 
the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty provides the European environmental 
vehicle with three gears: besides the "standard" and "high-
speed" provisions established by the EEC Treaty, Art. 130 s 
sec. 5 EC Treaty introduces a negative derogation: if an 
environmental measure entails excessive costs for one Member 
State an exemption and/or financial support from the Cohesion 
Fund55 may be granted. Thus, a three-speed Europe is 
explicitly established by the Maastricht Treaty56. 
 
A multi-speed Europe may be provoked by the so-called 
subsidiarity rule. This rule was deleted in Art. 130 r and is 
now established in Art. 3 b EC Treaty; thus it is generally 
applicable to all provisions of the EC Treaty. The 
subsidiarity rule as stipulated by Art. 3 b EC Treaty differs 
significantly from the "old" one, insofar as it introduces an 
additional test: 
 
In those fields not falling in its exclusive competence 
the Community takes action only according to the 
principle of subsidiarity, only if and so far as an 
objective of measures envisaged cannot be sufficiently 
achieved at national level and, therefore, can be better 
                     
54
 see: Krämer, in v.d.Groeben/Thiesing/Ehlemann, Kommentar zum EWG-
Vertrag, 4. edition 1991, p. 3981 et seq.; Krämer, Environmental 
Protection and Art. 30 EEC Treaty, Common Market Law Review 30 
(1993), p. 111. 
55
 Art. 130 d EC Treaty; see also: Breier, Fn. 36, p. 461. 
56
 see: Epiney/Furrer, Fn. 29, p. 403. 
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attained, due to its extent or effects, at Community 
level. 
 
The word "subsidiarity" is now explicitly used in Art. 3 b EC 
Treaty. There is, however, barely a term in the EC Treaty 
which has experienced that many interpretations as the term 
"subsidiarity"57. Some construe the subsidiarity rule as a 
provision creating rights and obligations for the Member 
States: they have to take care that the objectives of the 
Community are also achieved by the Member States. If they are 
not capable or willing to attain the Community goals, the 
Community may act58. Others reduce the subsidiarity rule to a 
mere declaration of political intent, not justiciable59, or 
attribute not very much importance to it as it will have only 
limited justiciability60. The Council of Environmental 
Ministers explained in its decision on the Fifth 
Environmental Action Programme that the application of the 
subsidiarity rule may neither set back existing Community 
policies nor impede a future efficient development in this 
                     
57
 see: Lambers, Subsidiarität in Europa - Allheilmittel oder 
juristische Leerformel? EuR 1993, 229; Blanke, Das 
Subsidiaritätsprinzip als Schranke des Europäischen 
Gemeinschaftsrechts? ZG, 1991, 133; Constantinesco, 
"Subsidiarirät": Magisches Wort oder Handlungsprinzip der 
Europäischen Union?, EuZW 1991, 561; Hochbaum, Kohäsion und 
Subsidiarität - Maastricht und die Länderkulturhoheit, DÖV 1993, 
285; Hummer, Subsidiarität und Föderalismus als Strukturprinzipien 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaft?, ZfRV 1992, 81; Konow, Zum 
Subsidiaritätsprinzpip des Vertrags von Maastricht, DÖV 1993, 405; 
Pipkorn, Das Subsidiaritätspinzip im Vertrag über die Europäische 
Union - rechtliche Bedeutung und gerichtliche Überprüfbarkeit, EuZW 
1992, 697; Scherer, Subsidiaritätsprinzip und EG-Agrarform, DVBl. 
1993, 281; Schmidhuber/Hitzler, Die Verankerung des Subsidiaritäts-
prinzips im EWG-Vertrag - ein wichtiger Schritt auf dem Weg zu 
einer föderalen Verfassung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, NVwZ 
1992, 720; Schmidhuber, Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip im Vertrag von 
Maastricht, DVBl. 1993, 417; Stewing, Subsidiarität und Föderalis-
mus in der Europäischen Union, Köln 1992, Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip 
als Kompetenzverteilungregel im Europäischen Recht, DVBl. 1992, 
1516; Toth, The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, 
CMLR 1992, 1079; Sedemund/Montag, Die Entwicklung des Europäischen 
Gemeinschaftsrechts, NJW 1994, 625; Oppermann/Classen, Die EG vor 
der Europäischen Union, NJW 1993, p. 5, 8. 
58
 see: Epiney/Furrer, Fn. 29, p. 374.  
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 see: Lambers, Fn. 57, p. 229. 
60
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field61. This view of a limited importance of the 
subsidiarity rule as regards Community competences is 
sustained by others stating that the "acquis communautaire" 
has to be maintained. If an intended measure is a clear annex 
to a measure previously taken by the Community, a Community 
competence shall be assumed62. The subsidiarity rule is 
regarded to give the Community the competence to take action 
only vis-à-vis specific Member States: one outcome would be a 
development of a variable geometry/subsidiarity hybrid 
whereby Community action would be justified and lawful in 
some Member States which had showed themselves unable or 
disinclined to comply with acceptable standards of 
environmental protection, but not in others which had not63. 
The roman-catholic encyclica "Quadragesimo Anno", dated 1931, 
is quoted in order to define what "subsidiarity" means64.  
 
This rather limited selection of definitions of 
"subsidiarity" and its legal effects shows that the 
subsidiarity rule may be given the interpretation suiting 
best the political goal envisaged, in particular, as neither 
the meaning nor the justiciability of the "old" subsidiarity 
rule has ever been tested in the European Court of Justice.  
 
Regardless of the aforementioned interpretations of the 
subsidiarity rule the wording of Art. 3 b EC Treaty evokes 
the following questions: 
 
(1) which areas fall within the exclusive competence of the 
Community and what is the extent of these competences? 
How do these compentences have to be construed - narrow 
(similar to the German Supreme Court) or extensive (as 
                     
61
 Decision of Council of Dec. 16, 1992, Com (92) 23.  
62
 Schmidhuber/Hitzler: Fn. 57, NVwZ 1992, p. 720 (723). 
63
 see: Lane, Fn. 24, p. 971. 
64
 see: Lambers, Fn. 57, p. 230; Pipkorn, Fn. 57, p. 698. 
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applied by the European Court of Justice, using the 
"implied powers"-doctrine and the "effet utile"-
interpretation)? 
 
(2) How shall the (new) subsidiarity rule, containing a 
negative and positive test, be applied? When is an 
action at Member State level "sufficient to attain a 
Community goal"? What will be the standard for 
"sufficiency"? What are the criteria forming the basis 
for the sufficiency judgement? How is this combination - 
not sufficient on Member State level, and therefore 
better on Community level - to be construed?  
 
(3) Who is going to pass the final judgement whether the 
subsidiarity rule has been applied in an adequate way 
(justiciability?)65. 
 
(4) Does the subsidiarity rule have any impact on the 
construction of competence norms as developed by the 
European Court of Justice, i.e. does the intent 
underlying the introduction of the subsidiarity rule, to 
reduce Community action, have any impact on the 
extensive interpretation of Community competences and 
request that the "implied powers" and "effet utile" 
principle are given up by the European Court of 
Justice66? 
 
 None of these questions can be answered at the moment in 
a definitive way. A host of uncertainties is connected 
with the construction and application of the 
subsidiarity rule. The variety of interpretations 
invites to pick the one which seems to be most suitable 
                     
65
 see: Lambers, Fn. 57, p. 234 et seq.; Pipkorn, Fn. 57, p. 699. 
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to the respective political intents. Depending on the 
context the subsidiarity rule may have a different 
impact. In the field of cultural affairs the 
subsidiarity rule may enhance and protect cultural 
diversity. An effective protection of the environment, 
however, air and water not being confined to national 
and regional borders, may be seriously impaired by a 
construction of the subsidiarity rule as a means to 
preserve national and regional diversity as regards 
environmental legislation and standards. The Maastricht 
Treaty, enhancing the environmental protection and 
upgrading it on one hand introduces on the other a 
principle which has no clearly defined legal content, 
which protects interests not connected with a better 
protection of the environment, and which may be abused 
as a vehicle to reserve or regain national competences 
which may be contraproductive as regards an ever better 
protection of a naturally integrated environment. 
Differing national environmental standards may impede 
inter-state trade and create a distortion of 
competition.  
 
 
D. The Impact of the Maastricht-Decision on the 
Environmental Provisions of the EC Treaty 
 
The openness of Art. 3 b EC Treaty, in particular, the 
subsidiarity rule allows national side tracks such as the one 
chosen by the German Supreme Court. The unresolved conflict 
between environmental protection on a high level on one hand 
and protection of national and regional authority on the 
other, basic questions of the applicability and 
justiciability of the subsidiarity rule not having been 
decided yet, provides the entity applying the principle with 
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vast discretion. A broad construction of the subsidiarity 
principle in conjunction with the principle of limited 
competences may even lead to the conclusion that the broad 
interpretation of Community principles as developed by the 
European Court of Justice can no longer be sustained, like 
the German Supreme Court held. Although the German Supreme 
Court is not competent according to Art. 164, 177 EC Treaty 
it reserved the right to check whether a specific Community 
action, e.g. in the environmental field, is in compliance 
with Art. 130 r to t EC Treaty, these competence norms being 
construed in a narrow way, excluding the application of 
"implied powers" and "effet utile". Following the general 
line of the Maastricht-Decision, the - until now - dynamic 
and extensive construction of EC competence provisions in the 
environmental field will have to be construed in a narrow way 
in order to avoid the result that the German Supreme Court 
declares a specific piece of environmental legislation as not 
binding in Germany. By introducing such a national "opt out" 
possibility the German Supreme Court tries to influence 
indirectly the interpretation of competence norms on the EC 
level. If the Community desires that a piece of Community 
legislation be binding in all Member States it has to stick 
to the (narrow) construction of EC competence provisions as 
stated by the German Supreme Court.  
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E. Résumé  
 
 
The German Supreme Court advocates in its decision on the 
Maastricht Treaty a narrow interpretation and application of 
Community competences introduced, maintained or amended by 
the Treaty on European Union. The dynamic expansion of 
environmental protection on the Community level, propelled by 
an extensive application of Art. 235 EC Treaty, by the 
principles of "implied powers" and "effet utile" developed by 
the European Court of Justice, is significantly slowed down 
by the German Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of 
the principle of enumerated EU-competences and its extensive 
construction of the principle of subsidiarity in the way most 
favourable to the preservation of national influence and 
legislative competence. 
 
The German Supreme Court usurps the right to pass the final 
judgement whether an EU-action is within the scope of the 
integration programme of the Maastricht Treaty as approved by 
the German parliament. If the Supreme Court reaches the 
conclusion that a specific EU-action does not meet the 
standards established by the Supreme Court, i.e. extends the 
EC-competences as provided by the Maastricht Treaty, the 
EU-decision will not be binding on Germany. Although claiming 
a "cooperation" with the European Court of Justice, the 
German Supreme Court intrudes with the above ruling into the 
realm of the European Court of Justice, negating basic 
principles established by the E.C.J. and challenging its 
authority to pass the final and (Community-wide) binding 
judgement on the compliance of secondary EU-legislation with 
the EU Treaty, thus creating a German "opt-out"-provision. 
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The provisions on the protection of the environment do not 
appear to have been altered in a spectacular way by the 
Maastricht Treaty. A thorough analysis, however, taking into 
consideration the above rules of interpretation established 
by the German Supreme Court will produce a different picture: 
The amendments may entail far-reaching consequences such as 
lowering the Community-wide level of environmental protection 
and increasing the variety of environmental regulations and 
standards, thus impeding free trade and augmenting the 
potential for distortion of competition. 
 
 
 
 
